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Abstract 
In this paper we describe a practical solution towards anonymous and verifi-
able databases based on the use of the recen t Improved Leigh ton- Micali protocol 
for the distribution of keys. The scheme is addressed particularly to public data 
held in separate government databases with the aim of preventing unauthorized 
government agents from gathering and merging private data concerning indi-
viduals from these separate containers. The solution can be realized through 
the recent Clipper Chip and smartcard technology, and its security relies on 
the strength of these technologies. The scheme is also extendible mobile infor-
mation systems. 
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1 Introduction 
Security of public data represents an issue which is increasingly becoming important 
and relevant to all individuals within the society. Public data can range from statis-
tics which bear no direct impact on any given individual in the society, to medical and 
financial information ,,,"hose disclosure may affect an individual's standing within so-
ciety. In traditional paper-based societies the gathering of such personal information 
concerning a particular individual was difficult to perform due to the sheer amount 
of manual work involved. Hence, only certain government bodies could afford such 
data gathering based on some legal warrant. 
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In today's computerized world the collection and transfer of voluminous amounts of 
information over wide geographic distances has been accepted as a common everyday 
occurrence. With recent advances in fiber optics technology, the notion of super-
highways for data is becoming a reality. With this increasing ease at which voluminous 
data can be transferred and the increasing speed of data processing systems, the 
capacity for data gathering and intelligent computerized processing has also been 
significantly increased. These advances which are beneficial to society from one point 
of view have raised questions from the opposite point of view, namely, of whether 
such computing power can be misused against society both by certain individuals 
within the society and by the very government upon which members of society have 
placed their trust. Accepting that for the functioning of the nation some trust must 
be placed by the society on its government, a method of assurance must still be used 
to guarantee that an individual's personal details which are spread across different 
government institutions cannot be illegally gathered and merged together giving a 
total picture of that person's private life. 
One of the earliest efforts directed into finding possible solutions to this problem 
is that by Brandt et al in [1]. This effort recognized that databases belonging to 
different institutions must provide to the individual users the properties of the users 
being anonymous and the databases being verifiable. More specifically, when different 
data items are given by an individual to these distinct and separate institutions, 
these data items should not be identifiable by others as having come from the one 
same individual. The true identity of each individual must remain unknown to other 
individuals and to each institution. Each individual must also have the ability to 
verify that his or her personal details held by an institution are correct. In practice, 
a separate trusted authority must be appointed who can maintain the true identity 
of each individual, and who can have the legal power to gather and merge details 
belonging to certain individuals if such a need arises. 
In this paper we investigate the issue of anonymous and verifiable databases in the 
context of recent technological developments, with the aim of presenting some prac-
tical solutions to the need of such databases. Our approach is founded on the use of 
smartcard technology coupled with an improved version of the recent key distribution 
protocol of [2, 3]. 
2 Motivations 
The need of a practical scheme to realize the notion of anonymous and verifiable 
databases is becoming self-evident in computerized nations. One recent example in 
A ustralia was the public debate over the A ustralian Identity Card [4 J by which every 
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Australian resident would be assigned a unique number as an identifying piece of 
information. This number would then be used as a pointer to cross-reference data 
in various government institutions which held information concerning the owner of 
the number. Although this move by the government was defeated, in actuality the 
government proceeded to use the citizens' taxation file numbers more or less as a 
substitute for the proposed identity card. 
One important recent development in the United States which has again brought the 
debate about citizens' right to privacy into the foreground is the introduction of the 
Clipper Chip [5J and its related technology. The Clipper Chip is a high-speed and 
high-security encryption device to be used by the U.S. Government for its telephone 
and other networking equipment. The chip has a classified encipherment algorithm 
and contains a secret key. Through a "key-escrow" system an appointed government 
agency can obtain a legal warrant to wiretap communications between any two parties 
that are using the device. The main idea behind this notion is to provide secure 
communications to the users of the Chip against external attacks, while at the same 
time allowing the government to monitor communications that are suspected of being 
a threat to national security or to the society in general (eg. drug traffickers, industrial 
espionage) [6,7, 8J. 
Here we do not argue for or against such a notion. What we propose, however, is 
that such a technology should bring to society as much benefit as possible. Since 
the technology is being imposed from above for one particular area of application, 
it should also be used in other areas in such a way that it will protect the rights of 
individuals. If indeed there is a strong ground for allowing an appointed government 
agency or authority to have powers to tap into private communications, at the very 
least one must ensure that this power and capability resides exclusively in the hands 
of the approved agency, and not of other government institutions. 
This paper extends the notions embodied in the Clipper Chip concept towards an-
other area, namely for providing ways to achieve anonymous and verifiable databases. 
vVe require the appointed agency or authority to be a trusted adjudicator between the 
members of society and the other ordinary government institutions. In this way sen-
sitive data concerning citizens in general may be guarded against illegal access while 
data concerning suspected citizens can be made readily available to the appointed au-
thority. In the following discussion we will denote the appointed government agency 
as the Trusted Authority (TA). vVe assume that each institution holds a database 
containing every individual's details which are relevant to the functioning of the in-
stitution. Any exchange of data between departments must be through the Trusted 
Authority who regulates as to which details are exchangeable and who enforces the 
chosen policies. Thus, for example, the taxation department holds taxation-related 
information, while the health department has a health record of individuals that 
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obtain medical service from the government hospitals. An individual is able to sub-
mit new details to each institution respectively, and each individual can query each 
database independently without his or her identity being revealed. 
Each individual has the duty to initially enroll himself or herself to the Trusted Au-
thority, bringing their personal identification information (eg. birth certificate, retina 
scan, fingerprint, DNA sequence). The Trusted Authority creates a pseudonym [1] for 
an individual corresponding to each institution that holds data about the individual. 
Hence, an individual has a different pseudonym when dealing with each institution. 
For each individual, the Trusted Authority issues a tamper-proof smart card contain-
ing that individual's set of pseudonyms and other cryptographic parameters. For a 
given institution, the Trusted Authority also issues cryptographic parameters which 
are stored in the tamper-proof smartcard belonging to an appointed trusted local 
authority (person) who is a representative of the institution (eg. system administra-
tor). Unlike the identity of individuals, each institution has a unique identity which 
is published. 
The database at each institution is assumed to be managed by a trusted DBMS which 
can be used by staff members at the site only through a number of tamper-free ter-
minals [9, 10J. These tamper-free terminals represents the only valid access points to 
the database. A number of tamper-free terminals are also provided at the site for use 
by visiting individuals in the public, while remote tamper-free terminals may also be 
connected provided that a secure channel can be created between the remote tamper-
free terminals to the local tamper-free terminals. The appointed representative for 
an institution has the duty to periodically load the cryptographic parameters from 
his or her smartcard to each of the resident tamper-free terminals at that institution. 
This configuration is shown in Figure 1. 
3 Towards a practical scheme 
In this section we present a practical scheme for anonymous and verifiable databases 
based on the Improved Leighton-Micali (ILM) protocol [3]. The original Leighton-
Micali protocol of [2] had an inherent flaw which in our context allowed an attacker to 
read data belonging to an individual when it is in transit between the institution and 
the individual's terminal. This flaw has subsequently been solved and the protocol 
improved by the work in [3J. 
Following the requirements of [2, 3], we assume that tamper-proof VLSI chips are 
readily available to be incorporated into smart cards and tamper-free terminals. vVe 
also assume that a publicly known one-way hash function h exists (which may also 
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Figure 1: Anonymous individuals and verifiable databases 
be replaced with a cryptographically strong pseudo-random function). 
When an individual wishes to submit data to an institution or to verify existing 
data held by an institution, he or she must interact via a tamper-free terminal which 
establishes a connection with another tamper-free terminal located at the institution. 
Communications between these two terminals must be via a session key which is 
selected by either terminal and is transferred securely to the other. The session key 
is then discarded by both terminals after the session is over. Newly submitted data 
is assumed to be placed in a temporary location within the institution's database to 
be read, verified and classified by one of the institution's staff members. Only then 
can such data be committed to the database. In the following, we assume that all 
communications are protected against replays (eg. via timestamps or nonces). 
3.1 Session Keys: The ILM Protocol 
In the 1LM protocol it is assumed that the Trusted Authority holds kI secret keys (Xl, 
... , Xi'v!). Each secret key is chosen uniformly at random by the Trusted Authority 
and is of length k-bits. For each user i who is enrolled into the system, the Trusted 
Authority selects AI random integers (aI, ... , aA,J) from the interval [I,L], where L 
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is an integer 1. 
The Trusted Authority then employs h to compute Ym = hO:m (Xm) for all m = 
1, ... ,lvI, where hS(X) indicates applying consecutively the function h on an input 
X for s times. That is, 
S times 
~
hS(X) = h(··· h(h( X))·· .). 
Here (0'1, ... , aM) becomes the public key of individual i which is known to all 
institutions. The corresponding secret key (Yi, ... , YM ) is then placed by the Trusted 
Authority into the tamper-proof chip of the individual's smartcard. The smartcard 
is only delivered to the individual after the secret key has been inserted, and hence 
no person has access to the secret keys or the other secret parameters within that 
individual's tamper-proof chip. 
Assuming that individual i needs to verify or submit data to institution j, then their 
respective terminals must establish a secure channel by way of encipherment using 
key Ki,j' This secure channel will afterwards be used to transfer the random session 
key Ks. The crucial requirement at this point is that both terminals must establish 
the same key K;,j independently without previous communications. This process can 
be done as follows [3J: 
1. The terminal of individual i must obtain the public key ((31, ... , (3iV!) of institu-
tion j. This public key can be resident in within each tamper-free terminal or 
it can be read by the terminal from a publicly readable file. 
2. After individual i inserts his or her smart card into the terminal, the terminal 
must provide the smartcard with the public key of the institution j. The tamper-
proof chip within the smartcard of individual i then computes the common key 
I(,j as: 
. < . 
Z =), 
i > j. 
where 8m = max(am , 13m), m = 1, ... , lvI, and II denotes concatenation. 
(1) 
Note that the tamper-proof chip can easily compute hOm(Xm) = hlom-o:ml(Ym) (m = 
1, ... , lvI) and thus Ki,j because it has available the values Ym = ho:m(Xm) residing in 
its internal memory. The tamper-proof chip of the terminal at the institution perform 
symmetric procedures, and thus obtain the same key Ki,j = Kj,i [3J. 
1 Leighton and Micali recommended the size of M be between 102 and 105 , and the size of L be 
about v'iJ. 
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In order to aid our subsequent discussions we will simplify Equation (1) into 
r { h(Xilillj), 
fii,j = h(Xlljlli), 
. < . 
Z =), 
i > j. 
(2) 
As before, the k-bit value X is chosen randomly by the Trusted Authority where k 
should be sufficiently large, say k ~ 100, in order to prevent it from an exhaustive 
search attack [3]. The value X is kept secret by the Trusted Authority, and during 
the enrollment of individuals the Trusted Authority also injects a copy of X into the 
chip of the smartcard belonging to the individual and into that belonging to the local 
authority at each institution. Hence, in fact, the value X is common to all parties in 
the system. 
3.2 Anonymity 
In order to provide anonymity to individuals within the system the trusted authority 
must create distinct pseudonyms for each user with respect to each of the institutions. 
In order to do this each individual i must enroll in-person to the Trusted Authority and 
provide it with some identification information Pi. The Trusted Authority uniformly 
chooses an identity h and a secret value Si, and associates them with Pi. It is the duty 
of the Trusted Authority to keep the values (Pi, h Si, SCi) secure, where SCi is the 
unique chip number built into the tamper-proof chip of the individual's smartcard. 
The same procedure is also observed for the local authority of each institution. 
Assuming that each institution has been assigned a publicly known identity BJ , the 
Trusted Authority creates the pseudonym hj of the individual with identity Ii with 
respect to Bj as: 
Here we assume that encoding scheme for the identities of individuals Ii and institu-
tions B j are uniform. The key STA is maintained as secret by the Trusted Authority. 
The secret value Si and the pseudonyms for an individual are then inserted into that 
individual's chip. Similarly, each institution is given the respective pseudonym that 
the individual will present to the institution. 
Another secret parameter injected into the tamper-proof chips of both the individual 
hj and the institution Bj is a database key Di,j, uniformly chosen by the Trusted 
Authority. This database key will be used to create other keys which are further used 
to control access to the database. Thus, for example, these created keys can be used 
to hide passwords of individuals, to encipher the access matrix or encipher the data 
in the database. In this paper we will use them to encipher stored data, although it 
is clear to the reader that other modes of their usage are possible. 
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3.3 Data storage 
Within each institution B j data in the database concerning individual hj must be 
stored in such a way that only the individual and the institution (ie. its staff) can 
view the data. Assuming Ri,j represents the data of individual Ii,j at institution B j , 
a key K R ;,} must be uniformly chosen by the local authority within the institution to 
be applied in order to hide data Ri,j' Bearing in mind that a secure DBMS running 
above a secure operating system is crucial for overall system security, there are a 
number of ways in which data can be stored in a manner that will make it accessible 
to users only through the key I<R;,}' One simple method through which data can be 
protected from unwanted disclosures is by way of the direct encipherment using the 
above key K R ;,} (see [11]). 
This encipherment key I<R;,} must also reside in an enciphered form under a key which 
is available to the individual. This key-enciphering key is calculated by the staff's 
terminal at the institution as: 
I ·· < B· I,) = )' 
hj> B j . 
(3) 
In addition, for each entry in the database belonging to the individual Ii,j, a signature 
or checksum [12, 13] must be created to prevent undetected changes to the data 
without the individual's consent. This is achieved by using the values Si and Sj which 
are in the tamper-proof chips of the individual and the institution's local authority 
respecti vely. 
More specifically, when the individual is requested by the institution to verify and 
approve the data Ri,j about the individual to be committed into the database, the 
tamper-proof chips of respective parties must generate certain parameters as input 
to the signature function sig. Thus, the chip belonging to the individual Ii,j creates 
ii,j = h(Ri,jIISiIIBj), while the chip belonging to the institution's local authority 
creates ij,i = h(Ri,jIISjIIIi,j) (note that here ti,j =1= ij,d. The two terminals onto 
which the individual and local authority are connected obtains the respective values 
from the chips within the respective (inserted) smartcards, and then the terminals 
exchange ii,j and ij,i over the secure channel established previously using the session 
key (Figure 2). 
After receiving ti,j from the individual's terminal, the institution's terminal then 
computes the signature for the individual's entry. That is, the entry for individual 
Ii,j within the database of institution B j is: 
8 
S mart card S mart card 
I I I 
1 1. Institution's 
I Chip I I Chip I Local Authority 
Individual Institution's staff 
L Terminal Terminal ~ 
{{KRtJ KEi.j' {~,i} KR;.j' sig(~,j, ti,j, ti,i)} K. 
{Ack}K, 
{Request} K. 
Figure 2: Interaction between individual's and institution's terminals 
where the symbol "{} K" denotes encipherment using key J{. 
The institution's terminal then sends this complete entry (including the signature) 
and Ri,j to the individual's terminal which re-computes the signature. If both signa-
tures are identical, the individual's terminal sends an acknowledgment to the terminal 
at the institution. Both terminals then erase the values ti,j and tj,i' In this manner, 
neither the individual nor the institution can modify the data illegally, since nei-
ther ii,j nor t j,i are ever directly available to the individual or the institution's staff 
respecti vely. 
If needed, the re-computed signature can also be sent by the individual's terminal to 
a lawyer who represents the individual. 
3.4 Verifiability 
When an individual Ii,j wishes to view his or her data R;.j held at an institution B j 
the individual must use his or her smartcard with a tamper-free terminal: 
1. The individual then selects via the tamper-free terminal the identity of the 
institution Bj that holds the data the individual wishes to view. 
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2. After inserting his or her smartcard into the tamper-free terminal, the terminal 
provides the smartcard, and thus the chip within, with the identity B j • The 
individual's terminal must also indicate to the institution's tamper-free terminal 
that a session is being requested. The institution's terminal then looks up the 
identity hj of the individual. 
3. The individual's chip then computes Ki,j, while the chip within the institution's 
terminal computes Kj,i. As before, J(i,j = J(j,i. 
4. The individual's terminal (or the institution's terminal) generates a seSSIOn 
key IC. The session key IC is then exchanged by way of enciphering it with 
J(i,j = J(j,i. 
5. The institution's terminal then instructs the database system to return the entry 
{I<R;,JKE ' {Ri,j}K
R 
,sig(Ri,j,ii,j,ij,;) for individual Ii,j. This entry is enci-
I,) I.J 
phered using the session key lis and the result is dispatched to the individual's 
terminal. 
6. The individual's terminal deciphers the entry using the session key lis, and the 
key-enciphering key J( Ei,j is recreated following Equation (3). The individual's 
terminal then recovers J(R',J and uses it to decipher and present to the individual 
the data R,j. The integrity of the data may also be verified by way of recreating 
the signature in the manner previously discussed. This would involve the insti-
tution's terminal re-computing ij,i and sending it to the individual's terminal 
via a secure channel. 
4 Remarks and Conclusion 
In this paper we have extended the notions embodied in the Clipper Chip concept to-
wards achieving anonymous and verifiable databases. The Trusted Authority creates 
a pseudonym for an individual corresponding to each institution that holds data about 
the individual. Hence, an individual has a different pseudonym when dealing with 
each institution. For each individual, the Trusted Authority issues a tamper-proof 
smart card containing that individual's set of pseudonyms and other cryptographic 
parameters. The database at each institution is assumed to be managed by a trusted 
DBMS which can be used by staff members at the site only through a number of 
tamper-free terminals These tamper-free terminals represents the only valid access 
points to the database. A number of tamper-free terminals are also provided at the 
site for use by individuals in the public, while remote tamper-free terminals may 
also be connected, provided a secure channel can be created between the remote 
tamper-free terminals to the local tamper-free terminals. When an individual wishes 
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to submit data to an institution or to verify existing data held by an institution, he 
or she must interact via a tamper-free terminal which establishes a connection with 
another tamper-free terminal located at the institution. Communications between 
these two terminals must be via a session key which is selected by either terminal 
and is transferred securely to the other. The session key is then discarded by both 
terminals after the session is over. 
The security of the scheme relies on the tamper-resistance of the chips and the ran-
domness of the one-way hash function. To reduce the risk of abusing stolen chips, 
authentication of a chip's owner should be conducted by such means as user pass-
word [3]. In current stage the scheme does not pretend to cover all possible points of 
attack, and clearly it does not provide a balanced burden of trust between an indi-
vidual and an institution. Afterall, it is the institution that maintains the database 
containing the individual's private information. In practice it is difficult to prevent 
an insitution from creating an informal and separate "black list" database containing 
"off-the-record" information upon which in reality it bases it's decisions concerning a 
given individual. Other security measures are also required to prevent staff members 
of an institution from sharing data illegally with other institutions (eg. manually 
copying onto a removable hard disk). The scheme in this paper represents a first step 
towards providing a practical mechanism in the face of an emerging new technology. 
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